Regulators around the world have started setting deadlines for moving to post-quantum cryptography. Below is the European Union and each of its 27 member states, followed by the UK, the US, Canada, Switzerland and nine countries in Asia-Pacific and the Middle East.
Every member state works to the EU's coordinated roadmap. Some have published national plans with their own dates and rules; the rest are due to publish theirs before the end of 2026.
AssessmentPlanRoll-outBy 2027: Operators: cryptographic inventory and quantum risk analysis finalised. By 2028: Post-quantum migration plans developed and validated. By 2030: Migration of the most critical systems complete, rolled out in phases in the agreed order of priority.
Key exchangeSymmetricEnd-2030: Quantum-resistant key establishment for information at a critical level of confidentiality. Mid-2030s: As far as possible, only 256-bit symmetric keys and hashes of 384 bits or more.
First stepsInventoryHigh-riskAll systemsEnd-2026: Initial national actions complete. Mar 2028 – Feb 2029: Cryptographic inventory in high- and very-high-priority organisations. End-2030: High-risk systems quantum-safe. End-2035: All systems quantum-safe.
ProductsHigh-riskAll systems1 Jan 2026: Products evaluated from this date must use post-quantum key establishment, and quantum-safe signatures or a justified exception. By 2030: High-risk systems: quantum-safe key establishment and authentication of software updates. By 2035: All public-key methods quantum-safe.
QualificationPurchasingFrom 2027: PQC obligations for ANSSI product qualification (ANSSI's target). After 2030: Buying products without PQC no longer reasonable.
ReadinessHigh-riskMedium-riskEnd-2026: Preparation and planning done: cryptographic inventory complete, a responsible body named, first migration steps under way. End-2030: High-risk use cases quantum-safe; approved products for classified information switched over. End-2035: Medium-risk use cases quantum-safe; migration complete for as many systems as possible.
InventoryHigh-riskPQC only1 May 2027: Essential entities: cryptographic inventory, high-risk systems identified, implementation plans ready. 1 Jan 2031: Essential entities use post-quantum or hybrid cryptography in high-risk systems. From 2036: Only post-quantum cryptography in all cybersecurity entities' information systems.
PolicyPlanProcurementHigh-riskMedium-riskEnd-2026: Quantum risk part of risk management; every organisation has its own cryptography policy. End-2027: Harvest-now-decrypt-later risk mitigated where needed; draft PQC migration plan, pilots, people and budget in place. End-2028: Quantum-safe requirements set in procurement; guidance issued to essential companies. End-2030: High-risk use cases migrated; software and firmware use quantum-safe cryptography by default. End-2035: Medium-risk use cases migrated; low-risk ones as far as possible.
StrategyHigh-riskMedium-riskEnd-2026: Strategy, governance, cryptographic inventory, use cases classified, pilots started for high- and medium-risk systems. End-2030: High-risk systems fully migrated. End-2035: Medium-risk systems migrated; low-risk ones as far as possible.
Inventory10+ yearsAll systemsNow: Raise it with management and inventory cryptographic assets, starting immediately. End-2030: Information that must stay confidential for more than ten years, such as health data. End-2035: Whole transition complete, including final evaluation and tuning.
Roadmap duePlanEnd-2026: A national roadmap with dates is expected before the end of 2026.. By 2029: National PQC migration plan adopted (task 3.2.1, led by the Ministry of Digital Affairs).
Roadmap dueEnd-2026: No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap applies: a national roadmap by end-2026, high-risk systems by end-2030, everything else as far as feasible by end-2035..
Roadmap dueEnd-2026: No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap applies: a national roadmap by end-2026, high-risk systems by end-2030, everything else as far as feasible by end-2035..
Roadmap dueEnd-2026: No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap applies: a national roadmap by end-2026, high-risk systems by end-2030, everything else as far as feasible by end-2035..
Roadmap dueEnd-2026: No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap applies: a national roadmap by end-2026, high-risk systems by end-2030, everything else as far as feasible by end-2035..
Roadmap dueEnd-2026: No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap applies: a national roadmap by end-2026, high-risk systems by end-2030, everything else as far as feasible by end-2035..
Roadmap dueEnd-2026: No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap applies: a national roadmap by end-2026, high-risk systems by end-2030, everything else as far as feasible by end-2035..
Roadmap dueEnd-2026: No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap applies: a national roadmap by end-2026, high-risk systems by end-2030, everything else as far as feasible by end-2035..
Roadmap dueEnd-2026: No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap applies: a national roadmap by end-2026, high-risk systems by end-2030, everything else as far as feasible by end-2035..
Roadmap dueEnd-2026: No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap applies: a national roadmap by end-2026, high-risk systems by end-2030, everything else as far as feasible by end-2035..
Roadmap dueEnd-2026: No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap applies: a national roadmap by end-2026, high-risk systems by end-2030, everything else as far as feasible by end-2035..
Roadmap dueEnd-2026: No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap applies: a national roadmap by end-2026, high-risk systems by end-2030, everything else as far as feasible by end-2035..
Roadmap dueEnd-2026: No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap applies: a national roadmap by end-2026, high-risk systems by end-2030, everything else as far as feasible by end-2035..
Cyber Security Coalition, Quantum Circle and the Centre for Cybersecurity Belgium (CCB) ·
Applies to: Belgian telecommunications operators designated as critical infrastructure
By 2027Operators: cryptographic inventory and quantum risk analysis finalised
By 2028Post-quantum migration plans developed and validated
By 2030Migration of the most critical systems complete, rolled out in phases in the agreed order of priority
A normative framework with minimum requirements from the telecom regulator: operators must start now, set a binding transition timeline and report progress, and BIPT supervises against it. For other organisations there is guidance from the Cyber Security Coalition, Quantum Circle and CCB white-paper series: volumes 1 and 2 are out, volume 3 is due on 20 November 2026.
Applies to: Federal, state and local administrations, and organisations and companies, especially critical infrastructure operators
End-2026Preparation and planning done: cryptographic inventory complete, a responsible body named, first migration steps under way
End-2030High-risk use cases quantum-safe; approved products for classified information switched over
End-2035Medium-risk use cases quantum-safe; migration complete for as many systems as possible
Urgent recommendations. The IT Planning Council and UP KRITIS are to make the deadlines binding by end-2026. Important and particularly important entities must already use state-of-the-art cryptography (section 30 BSIG).
Recommends that every organisation start now. For high-risk entities under the Information Security Act (ZInfV-1), PQC belongs in their security documentation, and a cryptographic inventory helps prove compliance. No national dates yet.
A national roadmap with dates is expected before the end of 2026.
Expected to publish before end of 2026 (12)
Austria
Expected before end of 2026
No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap dates apply.
Bulgaria
Expected before end of 2026
No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap dates apply.
Croatia
Expected before end of 2026
No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap dates apply.
Cyprus
Expected before end of 2026
No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap dates apply.
Denmark
Expected before end of 2026
No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap dates apply.
Greece
Expected before end of 2026
No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap dates apply.
Hungary
Expected before end of 2026
No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap dates apply.
Ireland
Expected before end of 2026
No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap dates apply.
Latvia
Expected before end of 2026
No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap dates apply.
Malta
Expected before end of 2026
No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap dates apply.
Portugal
Expected before end of 2026
No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap dates apply.
Romania
Expected before end of 2026
No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap dates apply.
Checked against each country's own documents. Titles are given in the language they were published in.
Beyond the EU
Outside the EU, each country sets its own dates, and they differ in force: some are binding rules, some supervisory expectations, some guidance. Each card says which. Move the slider to see what applies by a given year.
Requirements in scope
19/58
2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035
United Kingdom
In scope0 of 9
2028 Upcoming
Discovery and Planning
Define migration goals and scope
Complete full cryptographic discovery
Assess supplier and infrastructure dependencies
Publish an initial migration plan
2031 Upcoming
Priority Migration
Complete highest-priority migration activities
Protect critical assets first
Refine roadmap for full transition
2035 Upcoming
Full Transition Target
Complete migration of systems, services, and products to PQC
Retire remaining quantum-vulnerable public-key usage in scope
NIST finalized FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA), and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA)
PQC implementation and validation ecosystem accelerated
Jun 2026 Due this year
Migration Becomes Binding
Executive Order 14412 makes the federal transition a legal obligation rather than an inventory exercise
OMB M-26-15 replaces the M-23-02 regime with a five-phase migration timeline running to 2035
Every agency designates a post-quantum migration lead and submits a migration plan
Oct 2026 Background
NIST Transition Schedule Finalised
NIST finalises IR 8547: all quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms, RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, Diffie-Hellman and ECDH among them, are deprecated after 2030 and disallowed under NIST standards after 2035
Federal high value assets and high impact systems keep the earlier deadlines of EO 14412 and OMB M-26-15
Dec 2026 Due this year
Contractor Rulemaking
FAR Council to publish a proposed rule requiring covered contractors to meet the FIPS carrying PQC algorithms
Suppliers to federal agencies should expect the requirement to reach them by contract
31 Dec 2030 Upcoming
Key Establishment
High value assets and high impact systems use post-quantum key establishment
Covered federal contractors meet the same standards
31 Dec 2031 Upcoming
Digital Signatures
Post-quantum digital signatures in place across the same systems
Remaining quantum-vulnerable public-key usage retired on the NIST IR 8547 path to 2035
CSA, GovTech and IMDA publish version 1 of the handbook, with CSA's Quantum Readiness Index as a self-assessment tool
RSA, Diffie-Hellman and elliptic-curve cryptography at all key sizes are deprecated; ML-KEM, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA are recommended
31 Mar 2027 Upcoming
Migration Plan to CSA
CII owners submit their quantum-safe migration plan to CSA
From 1 Jan 2028 Upcoming
New Systems
New CII computer systems with a digital component are procured and implemented so that they support quantum-safe algorithms and technologies, or are quantum-safe ready
31 Dec 2031 Upcoming
Migration Complete
Quantum-safe migration completed across CII computer systems: vulnerable cryptography is no longer used
Critical sectors (government, defence, power, telecom, transport, banking, financial services and insurance): a quantum lead appointed, governance with board oversight in place
Cryptographic discovery and inventory complete; quantum risk analysed and assets prioritised
Vendors asked for CBOMs and quantum resiliency roadmaps from FY 2026-27, and required to submit CBOMs from FY 2027-28
31 Dec 2028 Upcoming
Critical Sectors Migrate; Others Lay Foundations
Critical sectors: high-priority systems migrated, with no new classical-only deployments
Other enterprises: foundations in place - governance, inventory, risk analysis and pilots
31 Dec 2029 Upcoming
Full Adoption: Critical Sectors
Critical sectors: post-quantum cryptography the default across all systems, with quantum-vulnerable algorithms decommissioned or deprecated
31 Dec 2030 Upcoming
Other Enterprises Migrate
Other enterprises: high-priority systems migrated
31 Dec 2033 Upcoming
Full Adoption: Other Enterprises
Other enterprises: enterprise-wide transition to post-quantum or hybrid cryptography complete
NCII entities prepare data on their post-quantum migration, covering their systems, applications, services and infrastructure
The data goes to NACSA in the form and manner set out in its written notice, within three months of that notice
The return asks for a cryptographic inventory with SBOM and CBOM, a risk register, and a migration timeline across five phases: assess, select, validate, deploy and monitor
Procedures to identify and classify all cryptographic assets are accurate and comprehensive
Data, systems and services tied to cryptographic assets are classified by sensitivity and by priority for migration to quantum-resistant solutions
Cryptographic resilience of priority assets assessed, with constraints and third-party dependencies identified
End-Q1 2027 Upcoming
Quantum Risk Assessment
Enterprise-level assessment of quantum computing risks, aligned with enterprise risk management and covering operational, legal, regulatory and strategic risks, human resources included
Action plans developed for the risks identified
No date set Due this year
Plans and Governance
Plans and initiatives to reach the required cryptographic resilience, or appropriate alternatives, for all priority assets
Quantum computing risk a standing item for periodic monitoring at the Information Security Supervisory Committee and the Risk Committee, where applicable
Challenges and recommendations reported to the board of directors or its equivalent
Government entities develop clear, well-defined and officially approved plans for the transition from traditional encryption to post-quantum cryptography
The UAE Cybersecurity Council oversees the national migration with government bodies, and proposes ways to reduce quantum risk in sensitive systems with weak cryptography
The announcement of the policy sets no date for these plans