Quantum readiness compliance

Regulators around the world have started setting deadlines for moving to post-quantum cryptography. Below is the European Union and each of its 27 member states, followed by the UK, the US, Canada, Switzerland and nine countries in Asia-Pacific and the Middle East.

European Union

Every member state works to the EU's coordinated roadmap. Some have published national plans with their own dates and rules; the rest are due to publish theirs before the end of 2026.

The EU roadmap every member state works to

EU coordinated implementation roadmap (2025)
  1. End-2026

    Initial National Steps

    • Launch national transition strategies
    • Start identification, inventory, and awareness actions
    • Coordinate first implementation steps across member states
  2. Expected 2026-27

    From Recommendation to Obligation

    • Commission proposal inserts PQC transition into the NIS2 Directive as a named requirement (Article 7(2)(k))
    • Once adopted and transposed, NIS2 entities carry the duty in law rather than by recommendation
  3. End-2030

    High-Risk Use Cases

    • Transition high-risk and critical infrastructure use cases
    • Scale prioritized upgrades and pilots
    • Adopt PQC-by-default direction for new high-impact deployments
  4. 2035

    Broad Completion Horizon

    • Complete transition of remaining systems where feasible
    • Demonstrate sustained crypto-agility and governance

Where the 27 member states stand

As of 15 November 2026

  • National timeline published 10 A national document with its own dated milestones
  • Guidance published, roadmap pending 5 National guidance or a strategy, but no dated roadmap yet
  • Expected to publish before end of 2026 12 Nothing public yet; the EU roadmap asks for national roadmaps by end-2026

Deadlines side by side

National milestones on one axis. The dashed lines are the three EU dates every member state works to.

  • Planning and inventory
  • High-risk systems
  • Remaining systems
  • Products and procurement
  • Roadmap due
  • EU

Scroll sideways to see every year.

  1. Belgium
    By 2027: Operators: cryptographic inventory and quantum risk analysis finalised. By 2028: Post-quantum migration plans developed and validated. By 2030: Migration of the most critical systems complete, rolled out in phases in the agreed order of priority.
  2. Czechia
    End-2030: Quantum-resistant key establishment for information at a critical level of confidentiality. Mid-2030s: As far as possible, only 256-bit symmetric keys and hashes of 384 bits or more.
  3. Estonia
    End-2026: Initial national actions complete. Mar 2028 – Feb 2029: Cryptographic inventory in high- and very-high-priority organisations. End-2030: High-risk systems quantum-safe. End-2035: All systems quantum-safe.
  4. Finland
    1 Jan 2026: Products evaluated from this date must use post-quantum key establishment, and quantum-safe signatures or a justified exception. By 2030: High-risk systems: quantum-safe key establishment and authentication of software updates. By 2035: All public-key methods quantum-safe.
  5. France
    From 2027: PQC obligations for ANSSI product qualification (ANSSI's target). After 2030: Buying products without PQC no longer reasonable.
  6. Germany
    End-2026: Preparation and planning done: cryptographic inventory complete, a responsible body named, first migration steps under way. End-2030: High-risk use cases quantum-safe; approved products for classified information switched over. End-2035: Medium-risk use cases quantum-safe; migration complete for as many systems as possible.
  7. Lithuania
    1 May 2027: Essential entities: cryptographic inventory, high-risk systems identified, implementation plans ready. 1 Jan 2031: Essential entities use post-quantum or hybrid cryptography in high-risk systems. From 2036: Only post-quantum cryptography in all cybersecurity entities' information systems.
  8. Netherlands
    End-2026: Quantum risk part of risk management; every organisation has its own cryptography policy. End-2027: Harvest-now-decrypt-later risk mitigated where needed; draft PQC migration plan, pilots, people and budget in place. End-2028: Quantum-safe requirements set in procurement; guidance issued to essential companies. End-2030: High-risk use cases migrated; software and firmware use quantum-safe cryptography by default. End-2035: Medium-risk use cases migrated; low-risk ones as far as possible.
  9. Spain
    End-2026: Strategy, governance, cryptographic inventory, use cases classified, pilots started for high- and medium-risk systems. End-2030: High-risk systems fully migrated. End-2035: Medium-risk systems migrated; low-risk ones as far as possible.
  10. Sweden
    Now: Raise it with management and inventory cryptographic assets, starting immediately. End-2030: Information that must stay confidential for more than ten years, such as health data. End-2035: Whole transition complete, including final evaluation and tuning.
  11. Italy
    End-2026: A national roadmap with dates is expected before the end of 2026..
  12. Luxembourg
    End-2026: A national roadmap with dates is expected before the end of 2026..
  13. Poland
    End-2026: A national roadmap with dates is expected before the end of 2026.. By 2029: National PQC migration plan adopted (task 3.2.1, led by the Ministry of Digital Affairs).
  14. Slovakia
    End-2026: A national roadmap with dates is expected before the end of 2026..
  15. Slovenia
    End-2026: A national roadmap with dates is expected before the end of 2026..
  16. Expected before end of 2026 (12)

Country by country

National timeline published (10)

Belgium

National timeline

Communication of 13 January 2026 on minimum requirements and roadmap for the post-quantum transition in the telecommunications sector EN

Belgian Institute for Postal Services and Telecommunications (BIPT) ·

Preparing for the Quantum Era – Updated Strategic Guidance (White Paper Series on the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography, vol. 1) EN

Cyber Security Coalition, Quantum Circle and the Centre for Cybersecurity Belgium (CCB) ·

Applies to: Belgian telecommunications operators designated as critical infrastructure

  1. By 2027 Operators: cryptographic inventory and quantum risk analysis finalised
  2. By 2028 Post-quantum migration plans developed and validated
  3. By 2030 Migration of the most critical systems complete, rolled out in phases in the agreed order of priority

A normative framework with minimum requirements from the telecom regulator: operators must start now, set a binding transition timeline and report progress, and BIPT supervises against it. For other organisations there is guidance from the Cyber Security Coalition, Quantum Circle and CCB white-paper series: volumes 1 and 2 are out, volume 3 is due on 20 November 2026.

Czechia

National timeline

Minimální požadavky na kryptografické algoritmy (verze 4.1) CS

National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB) ·

Applies to: Obliged entities under the Cybersecurity Act (264/2025 Sb.)

  1. End-2030 Quantum-resistant key establishment for information at a critical level of confidentiality
  2. Mid-2030s As far as possible, only 256-bit symmetric keys and hashes of 384 bits or more

Obliged entities must take NÚKIB's cryptographic recommendations into account (Decrees 409/2025 and 410/2025 Sb.).

Estonia

National timeline

Eesti postkvant-krüptograafiale ülemineku riiklik teekaart ET

Ministry of Justice and Digital Affairs; prepared by Cybernetica ·

Applies to: Public-sector organisations by priority category; the private sector is encouraged to follow

  1. Q3 2026 Organisations assigned to priority categories
  2. End-2026 Initial national actions complete
  3. Mar 2028 – Feb 2029 Cryptographic inventory in high- and very-high-priority organisations
  4. End-2030 High-risk systems quantum-safe
  5. End-2035 All systems quantum-safe

National roadmap; proposes that requirements be set in regulation.

Finland

National timeline

Suomen kansallisen kryptotyöryhmän linjaukset kansallisiin PQC-salaustuotearviointeihin 1.1.2026 alkaen FI

National Cryptography Working Group, via Traficom's NCSC-FI ·

Applies to: Products in national security evaluations; organisations are advised to follow the EU timeline

  1. 1 Jan 2026 Products evaluated from this date must use post-quantum key establishment, and quantum-safe signatures or a justified exception
  2. By 2030 High-risk systems: quantum-safe key establishment and authentication of software updates
  3. By 2035 All public-key methods quantum-safe

Requirements for products submitted to national evaluation; recommendations otherwise.

France

National timeline

Applies to: Security products seeking ANSSI qualification, and anyone buying security products

  1. From 2027 PQC obligations for ANSSI product qualification (ANSSI's target)
  2. After 2030 Buying products without PQC no longer reasonable

ANSSI aims to make PQC a condition of qualification; the purchasing date is its recommendation. It advises hybrid post-quantum cryptography.

Germany

National timeline

Applies to: Federal, state and local administrations, and organisations and companies, especially critical infrastructure operators

  1. End-2026 Preparation and planning done: cryptographic inventory complete, a responsible body named, first migration steps under way
  2. End-2030 High-risk use cases quantum-safe; approved products for classified information switched over
  3. End-2035 Medium-risk use cases quantum-safe; migration complete for as many systems as possible

Urgent recommendations. The IT Planning Council and UP KRITIS are to make the deadlines binding by end-2026. Important and particularly important entities must already use state-of-the-art cryptography (section 30 BSIG).

Lithuania

National timeline

Lietuvos perėjimo prie postkvantinės kriptografijos planas LT

Government of Lithuania; coordinated by the Ministry of National Defence ·

Applies to: Cybersecurity entities under Lithuania's Cybersecurity Law, essential entities first

  1. 1 May 2027 Essential entities: cryptographic inventory, high-risk systems identified, implementation plans ready
  2. 1 Jan 2031 Essential entities use post-quantum or hybrid cryptography in high-risk systems
  3. From 2036 Only post-quantum cryptography in all cybersecurity entities' information systems

Binding: the government approved the plan and set the duties below.

Netherlands

National timeline

Rijksbrede Quantumstrategie NL

Dutch cabinet, nine ministries led by Economic Affairs and Climate ·

Applies to: Central government organisations

  1. End-2026 Quantum risk part of risk management; every organisation has its own cryptography policy
  2. End-2027 Harvest-now-decrypt-later risk mitigated where needed; draft PQC migration plan, pilots, people and budget in place
  3. End-2028 Quantum-safe requirements set in procurement; guidance issued to essential companies
  4. End-2030 High-risk use cases migrated; software and firmware use quantum-safe cryptography by default
  5. End-2035 Medium-risk use cases migrated; low-risk ones as far as possible

Policy for central government. The Cyberbeveiligingswet, the Dutch NIS2 law, separately requires a cryptography policy.

Spain

National timeline

Applies to: Public administrations and organisations in Spain

  1. End-2026 Strategy, governance, cryptographic inventory, use cases classified, pilots started for high- and medium-risk systems
  2. End-2030 High-risk systems fully migrated
  3. End-2035 Medium-risk systems migrated; low-risk ones as far as possible

Good-practice guide; follows the EU risk-based timeline.

Sweden

National timeline

Nationella rekommendationer för övergången till kvantsäker kryptografi 2026 SV

National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) at FRA ·

Applies to: Society at large, with a focus on entities covered by NIS2

  1. Now Raise it with management and inventory cryptographic assets, starting immediately
  2. End-2030 Information that must stay confidential for more than ten years, such as health data
  3. End-2035 Whole transition complete, including final evaluation and tuning

National recommendations, tied to the security measures the Cybersecurity Act (2025:1506) requires.

Guidance published, roadmap pending (5)

Poland

Guidance only

Applies to: A task for the Ministry of Digital Affairs, with ABW, the Ministry of National Defence, NASK and others

  1. By 2029 National PQC migration plan adopted (task 3.2.1, led by the Ministry of Digital Affairs)

The national cybersecurity strategy commits the government to adopting a PQC migration plan. No deadlines for organisations yet.

A national roadmap with dates is expected before the end of 2026.

Slovakia

Guidance only

Odporúčania pre kryptografické algoritmy (verzia 1.0) SK

National Security Authority (NBÚ) ·

Recommendation listing approved post-quantum algorithms; classical public-key algorithms only in hybrid use or as legacy being phased out.

A national roadmap with dates is expected before the end of 2026.

Slovenia

Guidance only

Recommends that every organisation start now. For high-risk entities under the Information Security Act (ZInfV-1), PQC belongs in their security documentation, and a cryptographic inventory helps prove compliance. No national dates yet.

A national roadmap with dates is expected before the end of 2026.

Expected to publish before end of 2026 (12)

Austria

Expected before end of 2026

No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap dates apply.

Bulgaria

Expected before end of 2026

No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap dates apply.

Croatia

Expected before end of 2026

No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap dates apply.

Cyprus

Expected before end of 2026

No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap dates apply.

Denmark

Expected before end of 2026

No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap dates apply.

Greece

Expected before end of 2026

No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap dates apply.

Hungary

Expected before end of 2026

No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap dates apply.

Ireland

Expected before end of 2026

No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap dates apply.

Latvia

Expected before end of 2026

No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap dates apply.

Malta

Expected before end of 2026

No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap dates apply.

Portugal

Expected before end of 2026

No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap dates apply.

Romania

Expected before end of 2026

No national document yet. Until one is published, the EU roadmap dates apply.

Checked against each country's own documents. Titles are given in the language they were published in.

Beyond the EU

Outside the EU, each country sets its own dates, and they differ in force: some are binding rules, some supervisory expectations, some guidance. Each card says which. Move the slider to see what applies by a given year.

2026

Requirements in scope

19/58

2026 2029 2032 2035

United Kingdom

In scope 0 of 9
2028 Upcoming

Discovery and Planning

  • Define migration goals and scope
  • Complete full cryptographic discovery
  • Assess supplier and infrastructure dependencies
  • Publish an initial migration plan
2031 Upcoming

Priority Migration

  • Complete highest-priority migration activities
  • Protect critical assets first
  • Refine roadmap for full transition
2035 Upcoming

Full Transition Target

  • Complete migration of systems, services, and products to PQC
  • Retire remaining quantum-vulnerable public-key usage in scope

United States

In scope 4 of 8
Aug 2024 Background

Standards Baseline Finalized

  • NIST finalized FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA), and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA)
  • PQC implementation and validation ecosystem accelerated
Jun 2026 Due this year

Migration Becomes Binding

  • Executive Order 14412 makes the federal transition a legal obligation rather than an inventory exercise
  • OMB M-26-15 replaces the M-23-02 regime with a five-phase migration timeline running to 2035
  • Every agency designates a post-quantum migration lead and submits a migration plan
Oct 2026 Background

NIST Transition Schedule Finalised

  • NIST finalises IR 8547: all quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms, RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, Diffie-Hellman and ECDH among them, are deprecated after 2030 and disallowed under NIST standards after 2035
  • Federal high value assets and high impact systems keep the earlier deadlines of EO 14412 and OMB M-26-15
Dec 2026 Due this year

Contractor Rulemaking

  • FAR Council to publish a proposed rule requiring covered contractors to meet the FIPS carrying PQC algorithms
  • Suppliers to federal agencies should expect the requirement to reach them by contract
31 Dec 2030 Upcoming

Key Establishment

  • High value assets and high impact systems use post-quantum key establishment
  • Covered federal contractors meet the same standards
31 Dec 2031 Upcoming

Digital Signatures

  • Post-quantum digital signatures in place across the same systems
  • Remaining quantum-vulnerable public-key usage retired on the NIST IR 8547 path to 2035

Canada

In scope 2 of 4
April 2026 Due this year

Departmental Plans

  • Each department develops an initial post-quantum migration plan
Annually from April 2026 Annual

Progress Reports

  • Departments report on their post-quantum migration progress
End of 2031 Upcoming

High-Priority Systems

  • Migration of high-priority systems completed, with quantum-vulnerable algorithms disabled, isolated or tunnelled
  • High-priority systems are those protecting information in transit over public network zones, which is at risk of harvest now, decrypt later
End of 2035 Upcoming

Remaining Systems

  • Migration of all remaining systems completed

Switzerland

In scope 0 of 3
2025 Background

Federal Preparation and Sector Planning

  • Federal PKI guidance highlights post-quantum transition preparation
  • Public-sector teams plan key-length, trust-chain, and algorithm updates
  • Financial-sector action planning continues through SIF-led work
2026 Background

FINMA Guidance on Quantum Computing

  • FINMA publishes Guidance 05/2026 following a survey of 60 Swiss financial institutions
  • Only 8% of respondents had a specific roadmap for quantum-safe encryption
  • FINMA finds action is needed on operational risk and resilience requirements
Mid-2027 Upcoming

PQC Roadmap Deadline

  • FINMA recommends that a PQC roadmap be drawn up by mid-2027 at the latest
  • Strategy adopted by the board of directors, with an implementation plan setting out milestones and priorities
  • Target dates set for complete migration and for migration of critical business processes

Australia

In scope 0 of 3
End-2030 Upcoming

Traditional Asymmetric Cryptography Ceased

  • ASD recommends ceasing the use of traditional asymmetric cryptography
  • Organisations should have completed their post-quantum transition
  • Equipment and libraries bought for use beyond 2030 should aim to support ASD-approved post-quantum algorithms by 2030
  • ASD neither recommends nor prohibits hybrid post-quantum and traditional schemes

Singapore

In scope 0 of 3
Jul 2026 Background

Handbook Version 1 Published

  • CSA, GovTech and IMDA publish version 1 of the handbook, with CSA's Quantum Readiness Index as a self-assessment tool
  • RSA, Diffie-Hellman and elliptic-curve cryptography at all key sizes are deprecated; ML-KEM, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA are recommended
31 Mar 2027 Upcoming

Migration Plan to CSA

  • CII owners submit their quantum-safe migration plan to CSA
From 1 Jan 2028 Upcoming

New Systems

  • New CII computer systems with a digital component are procured and implemented so that they support quantum-safe algorithms and technologies, or are quantum-safe ready
31 Dec 2031 Upcoming

Migration Complete

  • Quantum-safe migration completed across CII computer systems: vulnerable cryptography is no longer used

Japan

In scope 0 of 3
Fiscal year 2026 Background

Roadmap

  • The government drafts the migration roadmap for government agencies, with the ministries concerned
By 2035 Upcoming

Migration Target

  • Government agencies aim, in principle, to complete migration to post-quantum cryptography by 2035
  • Systems handling especially sensitive information, or information needing very long protection, are considered for earlier migration, system by system
  • Each agency draws up its migration plan from the roadmap

India

In scope 0 of 8
31 Dec 2027 Upcoming

Foundations: Critical Sectors

  • Critical sectors (government, defence, power, telecom, transport, banking, financial services and insurance): a quantum lead appointed, governance with board oversight in place
  • Cryptographic discovery and inventory complete; quantum risk analysed and assets prioritised
  • Vendors asked for CBOMs and quantum resiliency roadmaps from FY 2026-27, and required to submit CBOMs from FY 2027-28
31 Dec 2028 Upcoming

Critical Sectors Migrate; Others Lay Foundations

  • Critical sectors: high-priority systems migrated, with no new classical-only deployments
  • Other enterprises: foundations in place - governance, inventory, risk analysis and pilots
31 Dec 2029 Upcoming

Full Adoption: Critical Sectors

  • Critical sectors: post-quantum cryptography the default across all systems, with quantum-vulnerable algorithms decommissioned or deprecated
31 Dec 2030 Upcoming

Other Enterprises Migrate

  • Other enterprises: high-priority systems migrated
31 Dec 2033 Upcoming

Full Adoption: Other Enterprises

  • Other enterprises: enterprise-wide transition to post-quantum or hybrid cryptography complete

Hong Kong

In scope 0 of 2
Jul 2026 Background

Whitepaper and Index Launched

  • HKMA launches its whitepaper on the quantum preparedness of Hong Kong's banking sector and the first Quantum Preparedness Index
  • The sector scores 2.3 out of 10; around half of the banks surveyed have no formal post-quantum planning
  • HKMA announces a PQC toolkit, co-developed with HKUST and the industry, and a series of workshops
By 2030 Upcoming

Sector Readiness

  • Banks reach full readiness, a Quantum Preparedness Index score of 10, which is HKMA's aim for the sector
  • Banks keep strengthening their cyber resilience, technology maturity and innovation capabilities through the transition

Malaysia

In scope 2 of 2
22 Sep 2025 In scope

Directive in Force

  • NCII entities prepare data on their post-quantum migration, covering their systems, applications, services and infrastructure
  • The data goes to NACSA in the form and manner set out in its written notice, within three months of that notice
  • The return asks for a cryptographic inventory with SBOM and CBOM, a risk register, and a migration timeline across five phases: assess, select, validate, deploy and monitor

Israel

In scope 4 of 4
7 Jan 2025 In scope

Supervisory Letter

  • Raise awareness and monitor quantum computing developments; brief the board and senior management at least every two years
  • Bring quantum risk into supply-chain cyber risk management, and avoid suppliers that are not preparing for the quantum era
  • Map encrypted information assets at rest, in motion with external parties and outside the organisation, as part of Directive 364
7 Jan 2026 Due this year

Preparedness Plan Due

  • An initial preparedness plan, discussed by the board and management, is submitted to the Banking Supervision Department

Saudi Arabia

In scope 6 of 8
End-Q4 2026 Due this year

Cryptographic Asset Inventory

  • Procedures to identify and classify all cryptographic assets are accurate and comprehensive
  • Data, systems and services tied to cryptographic assets are classified by sensitivity and by priority for migration to quantum-resistant solutions
  • Cryptographic resilience of priority assets assessed, with constraints and third-party dependencies identified
End-Q1 2027 Upcoming

Quantum Risk Assessment

  • Enterprise-level assessment of quantum computing risks, aligned with enterprise risk management and covering operational, legal, regulatory and strategic risks, human resources included
  • Action plans developed for the risks identified
No date set Due this year

Plans and Governance

  • Plans and initiatives to reach the required cryptographic resilience, or appropriate alternatives, for all priority assets
  • Quantum computing risk a standing item for periodic monitoring at the Information Security Supervisory Committee and the Risk Committee, where applicable
  • Challenges and recommendations reported to the board of directors or its equivalent

United Arab Emirates

In scope 1 of 1
27 Nov 2025 In scope

National Encryption Policy

  • Government entities develop clear, well-defined and officially approved plans for the transition from traditional encryption to post-quantum cryptography
  • The UAE Cybersecurity Council oversees the national migration with government bodies, and proposes ways to reduce quantum risk in sensitive systems with weak cryptography
  • The announcement of the policy sets no date for these plans