Name an owner across IT and OT and adopt a cryptography policy
IT and OT plan cryptography separately
Energy
Substations, control systems and meters stay in service for decades, and much of their cryptography can only change with the hardware. We map it across IT and OT, rank it by its impact on safety and supply, and plan the migration around your maintenance windows.
Protection relays, RTUs and meters often encrypt and sign in firmware or dedicated chips. Where the hardware cannot do post-quantum cryptography, replacement has to be planned years ahead.
Whoever can forge a firmware signature can load code onto devices across the grid. Code-signing keys move to quantum-safe signatures first.
GOOSE messages and sampled values must arrive within milliseconds. Larger keys and signatures have to be tested against those budgets before they reach a substation.
NIS2 asks for a cryptography policy, the EU network code for cross-border electricity sets minimum controls, and the EU roadmap dates critical infrastructure for 2030.
Each card is a system we inventory, in IT and OT alike. Its coloured edge shows how exposed its cryptography is.
Every action in the roadmap says what to change, why - the finding behind it - who owns it, how long it takes and in which quarter. Opened up, it adds the steps, what it waits on, how done is proven and which rule it serves.
Name an owner across IT and OT and adopt a cryptography policy
IT and OT plan cryptography separately
Complete the CBOM for IT and the control centre
SCADA, EMS and the IT/OT boundary
Record substation and RTU cryptography from config exports
No scanning in the field
Hybrid IKEv2 VPN at the IT/OT boundary
F-005 · DH group 14 on DMZ tunnels
Write PQC requirements into substation and meter tenders
Equipment bought now runs past 2040
Retire TLS 1.0 on SCADA web clients
F-016 · 11 clients on TLS 1.0
Move firmware signing to LMS or ML-DSA
F-011 · one RSA-2048 key signs all field firmware
Test post-quantum signature sizes against GOOSE timing
Messages must arrive within milliseconds
Get PQC dates from relay, RTU and meter vendors
9 OT vendors without a published plan
Hybrid TLS for market and TSO data exchange
F-008 · ECDHE only on AS4 links
Re-scan and update the CBOM
Confirm the Q2–Q3 changes
Evidence pack for NIS2 and the network code
Supervisory review
Move firmware signing to LMS or ML-DSA
F-011 · One RSA-2048 key signs all field firmware, and devices check it for 20+ years. A forged signature would load code across the grid.