Your sector, the same method

Healthcare, public administration, manufacturing, logistics, technology: the cryptography is the same everywhere. What changes is how long your data must stay secret, which systems are hardest to change and who asks you for proof. We weigh all three for your organisation.

every key, certificate, protocol and library in one inventory
1 CBOM every key, certificate, protocol and library in one inventory
data shelf life, migration effort and the rules that apply to you
3 factors data shelf life, migration effort and the rules that apply to you
EU date for high-risk use cases
End-2030 EU date for high-risk use cases

Why it matters now

A city skyline at night, lit office towers and streets
01

Harvest now, decrypt later

Patient records, citizen data, designs and contracts copied today can be read once a quantum computer exists. What has to stay secret longest is exposed first.

02

Migrations take years

Earlier cryptographic transitions took organisations a decade. Systems that are hard to change - devices, embedded controllers, legacy applications - set your real timeline.

03

Suppliers set part of the pace

Much of your cryptography arrives inside products and services you buy. Their roadmaps belong in yours, and your tenders should ask for them.

04

Regulators expect a plan

NIS2 asks for a cryptography policy across many sectors, national agencies have published dates, and the EU roadmap sets 2030 for high-risk use cases.

Where the cryptography sits in a typical organisation

Each card is a system we inventory. Its coloured edge shows how exposed its cryptography is.

PEOPLE AND DEVICES YOUR ESTATE THIRD PARTIES Staff and remote work VPN · SSO · MFA Customers and citizens TLS 1.3 · ECDHE Devices and OT Firmware RSA/ECDSA · TLS Websites and portals TLS · RSA/ECDSA X.509 Business applications andAPIs mTLS · JWS Network and VPN IPsec · SSH · MACsec Identity and PKI PKI · Kerberos · LDAPS Data and backups AES · TDE · Backup Email and documents S/MIME · STARTTLS Cloud and SaaS TLS · KMS Suppliers and partners SFTP · API · VPN Authorities and regulators TLS · PAdES HNDL HNDL
Public-key cryptography a quantum computer breaks Symmetric keys or legacy algorithms to check HNDLTraffic worth recording today to read later Illustrative, a typical estate rather than a client’s.

What you receive

  • A CBOM of your estate, in CycloneDX 1.7
  • Risk-ranked findings with HNDL flags
  • A tailored migration roadmap with dates and owners
  • A readiness list for your suppliers
  • Evidence for the regulators that oversee you

An actionable plan, not a list of intentions

Every action in the roadmap says what to change, why - the finding behind it - who owns it, how long it takes and in which quarter. Opened up, it adds the steps, what it waits on, how done is proven and which rule it serves.

Migration roadmap Other industries · Q1–Q4 2027
Estimated completion
Q2 2029
Actions this year
12
Open work
38engineer-weeks
HNDL links still open
2
PreparationBaseline understandingPlanning and executionMonitoring and evaluation
Q1 2027 8 wk
A-01 Done

Name a migration owner and adopt a cryptography policy

No owner for cryptographic change

CISO · 2 wk

A-02 In progress

Complete the CBOM across the estate

27% of hosts not yet scanned

Platform team · 4 wk

A-03

Rank systems by how long their data must stay secret

Personal data kept 10+ years

Business owners · 2 wk

Q2 2027 10 wk
A-04 HNDL

Hybrid TLS on public websites and APIs

F-002 · classical key exchange on 22 endpoints

Network team · 5 wk

A-05

Retire TLS 1.0 and SHA-1 certificates

F-010 · 17 legacy endpoints

Platform team · 2 wk

A-06 Vendor

Get PQC dates from top suppliers and cloud providers

14 suppliers without a published plan

Procurement · 3 wk

Q3 2027 16 wk
A-07 HNDL

Move remote-access VPN to hybrid IKEv2

F-004 · DH group 14 on the staff VPN

Network team · 6 wk

A-08

Upgrade to OpenSSL 3.5 and OpenSSH 10 across the fleet

F-013 · 46 hosts on libraries without ML-KEM

Platform team · 6 wk

A-09

Pilot ML-DSA certificates from the internal CA

Issuing CA signs with RSA-2048

PKI team · 4 wk

Q4 2027 6 wk
A-10

AES-256 and re-wrapped keys for backups

F-020 · 128-bit keys on long-term backups

Infrastructure · 3 wk

A-11

Re-scan and update the CBOM

Confirm the Q2–Q3 changes

CISO · 1 wk

A-12

Board report and evidence pack

Annual risk review

CISO · 2 wk

A-04

Hybrid TLS on public websites and APIs

Network team · 5 engineer-weeks · Q2 2027

HNDL

Why

F-002 · 22 internet-facing endpoints offer classical key exchange only. The traffic includes personal data kept for 10+ years (HNDL).

Steps

  1. Upgrade TLS terminators to OpenSSL 3.5 or a vendor release with ML-KEM
  2. Offer X25519MLKEM768 first, with X25519 as the fallback
  3. Test clients and integrations in staging
  4. Roll out site by site, watching handshake errors
  5. Re-scan
Waits on
CDN and load-balancer support
Done when
A re-scan shows hybrid key exchange on all 22 endpoints
Serves
NIS2 Art. 21(2)(h) · EU roadmap, high-risk by 2030
Illustrative: actions, findings and figures are invented for this page, in the format the platform produces.

Tell us how your organisation is regulated